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FISCHER v. KLETZ: ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY FOR
NONDISCLOSURE OF ERROR DISCOVERED
SUBSEQUENT TO CERTIFICATION
OF ANNUAL REPORT
In Fischer v. Kletz' the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York rendered an opinion which may
have a profound effect on the accounting profession. By denying
the defendant accounting firm's motion to dismiss, the court im-
plied that investors may have a remedy at law against account-
ants who fail to disclose information acquired subsequent to their
certification of a corporation's annual report. The ruling, although
restricted to circumstances in which the subsequently acquired in-
formation reveals material inaccuracies in the certified report, po-
tentially broadens the scope of an accountant's liability in the
interest of securing accurate and current financial information for
the investing public. This Note will evaluate the precedent for
and propriety of imposing liability on an accountant for nondis-
closure of after-acquired information.
Fischer v. Kletz2 is a class action for damages instituted by
stockholders and bondholders of Yale Express System, Inc. (Yale)
against the company's former officers and directors and the ac-
counting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM). PMM had
been employed by Yale to audit the corporation's 1963 financial
statements.3 The annual report, containing PMM's certification of
these statements, was issued to Yale stockholders on April 9, 1964.
Approximately three months later, on June 29, 1964, a report con-
taining the certified financial statements was filed with the Sec-
urities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
PMM had also been commissioned early in 19641 to conduct a
special survey of Yale's past and current income and expendi-
1. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Id.
3. Yale was required to have its annual report certified by an inde-
pendent public accountant and filed with the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission because its securities were registered on a national securities
exchange. Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1964).
4. Since the issue of liability was raised on a motion to dismiss, there




tures. At some point during this survey,5 PMM discovered sub-
stantial inaccuracies in the figures of the 1963 annual report.
Yale's management was notified of PMM's findings by November
1964.6 PMM did not, however, communicate its discoveries to the
SEC or the exchanges on which Yale stock was registered until
May 5, 1965. Yale subsequently went into bankruptcy.7 The plain-
tiffs brought suit, contending that since PMM knew its audit and
certification would be relied upon by the investing public, it had a
duty to reveal the gross falsity of the 1963 financial statements.
The federal district court denied PMM's motion to dismiss,
reasoning that liability for nondisclosure might be imposed under
either of two theories. At common law, PMM might be liable in
an action based on deceit; under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act8 and SEC rule lOb-5, 9 PMM might be civilly liable to
persons injured because of its nondisclosure.' 0 Noting that the
claims raised "novel and difficult issues" which would require
further factual and legal development, the court delayed a final
decision on the theories of liability asserted."
COMMON LAW LIABILITY
The original common law action of deceit required actual fraud
to establish a valid cause of action. The opinion of Lord Halsbury
in Derry v. Peek12 aptly summarizes the traditional common law
attitude: "To quote the language some centuries old in dealing
with actions of this character, 'fraud without damage, or damage
without fraud' does not give rise to such actions."'1 3 This maxim
5. This date is also disputed. Plaintiff claims the discovery was
made prior to the June 29th filing of the annual report with the SEC.
PMM declares it was after this date. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 183n.2 (1967).
6. 266 F. Supp. at 196-97.
7. See the earlier opinion in Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539, 540
(1966).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
10. The plaintiffs in Fischer predicated liability on a third theory-
violation of section 18a of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (a)
(1964). This section imposes civil liability for filing a false or misleading
report pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act or any rule or regulation
thereunder, provided that the injured party relied on the statement without
knowledge that it was false or misleading and that the party making the
representation knew of its falsity or misleading nature. Liability under
this section will depend on whether PMM discovered the error in its
certification prior to filing it with the SEC. This question is a factual
problem to be determined at trial. 266 F. Supp. at 189. Liability was also
claimed to arise from certain interim statements issued by Yale in which
Yale used PMM's figures on PMM's recommendation. 266 F. Supp. at 194.
This issue will not be discussed in this Note.
11. 266 F. Supp. at 194.
12. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
13. Id. at 343.
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justified the decision in Derry v. Peek. The House of Lords re-
jected an appeal by a purchaser of bonds to allow recovery against
corporate directors for their false representations which induced
the plaintiff to purchase the bonds. One basis for rejecting the
claim for damages was that the directors had an honest belief in
their misrepresentations; thus the necessary intent to defraud was
missing. The significance of Derry v. Peek is that the court used
a purely subjective standard with a very limited scope of liability
to determine the presence of fraud. Although there was some hint
that reckless misstatements which amounted to fraud might form
the basis for an action in deceit,14 the majority rejected this theory.
Since Derry v. Peek, courts have gradually extended the con-
cept of fraud to include reckless misrepresentation 5 and partial
truths.' Indeed, nondisclosure has been the basis for the action.
17
When nondisclosure has resulted in liability, however, there has
usually been a special relationship between the parties. This
relationship, whether fiduciary' s or that of parties to a business
transaction, 9 is generally of paramount importance in the deter-
mination of liability. The situation presented in Fischer is novel in
that the accountant-investor relation is not one which falls within
the traditional concept of a special relationship. The court there-
fore found it necessary to broaden one of the accepted relationships,
"parties to a business transaction, ' '20 to include the relationship of
14. Id. at 350.
15. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
The court of appeals, holding that the defendant accountants were guilty
of fraud, said:
The haphazard method used in arriving at these figures and the
failure to follow usual accounting practice supports the contention
urged by plaintiff, without answer or explanation upon this rec-
ord, that defendants, in preparing this balance sheet, were negli-
gent to such an extent as to amount to a reckless disregard for the
accuracy necessary for a balance sheet to give the proper reflec-
tion of the condition of the business.
rd. at 121, 15 N.E.2d at 422-23.
16. Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranch Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888):
[11f, with intent to deceive, either party to a contract of sale
conceals or suppresses a material fact, which he is in good faith
bound to disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to a false
representation, because the concealment or suppression is in effect
a representation that what is disclosed is the whole truth.
Id. at 388. See PROssER, TORTs 711 (3d ed. 1964).
17. Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893); Hush v. Reaugh, 23
F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ill. 1938).
18. See Foreman v. Henry, 87 Okla. 272, 210 P. 1026 (1922); DeSwarte
v. First National Bank, 188 Wis. 455, 206 N.W. 887 (1926).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551(2) (b) (1938):
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transac-
tion is consummated
(b) any subsequently acquired information which he recognizes
as making untrue or misleading a previous representation which




certifying public accountant to prospective shareholder. Through
an examination of the common law authorities on nondisclosure,
the extent of and limitations on this approach will be discussed.
A crucial distinction to be drawn in examining nondisclosure
cases is whether the after-acquired information reveals that the
representation was false when made, or whether it shows that the
facts or conditions which were the subject of the representation
have changed. In the former "change of knowledge" situation,
the party making the representation has a good faith belief in its
accuracy when he makes it. Subsequently, he discovers that it is
misleading in some material respect. By contrast, in the "change
of conditions" situation, the after-acquired information reveals no
inaccuracies in the original representation. It does show, however,
that the representation is no longer accurate as a statement of
present conditions. The importance of this distinction will be de-
veloped in the subsequent discussion.
Analysis of the relevant cases suggests that the courts have
not made the distinction. One of the earliest cases imposing lia-
bility for nondisclosure is Loewer v. Harris.21 The plaintiff, on the
basis of representations. made by the defendant in January 1891,
began negotiations to purchase the defendant's brewery. Four
months later the parties signed a contract of sale and the plaintiff
made an initial payment of $5,000. During the four month
negotiation period, the profits and output of the brewery declined
substantially, but the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of
the changed conditions. The plaintiff attempted to rescind the
contract when he learned of the decline, but the defendant refused
to return the initial payment. The Second Circuit sustained a
verdict for the plaintiff, holding that a seller who has made rep-
resentations on which he knows a buyer to be relying has a duty
to inform the buyer of subsequent material changes in the condi-
tions upon which the representations were based.12 This holding
was clearly restricted to a change of conditions situation.
Employing similar reasoning, the court in Equitable Life In-
surance Co. v. Halsey Stuart & Co.23 found liability for nondisclo-
sure. The defendant brokerage firm sent information to the plain-
tiff in an attempt to interest it in purchasing city improvement
bonds. During negotiations for the sale, the brokers represented
to plaintiff's vice president that the bonds were guaranteed by
Long-Bell Lumber Co. In May 1930, at plaintiff's request, the brok-
ers supplied Long-Bell's balance sheet for the year ending De-
cember 31, 1929. Largely in reliance on the information in the
balance sheet, the plaintiff purchased the bonds. The brokers had
21. 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893).
22. Accord, Hush v. Reaugh, 23 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ill. 1938); Monier
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 82 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1936).
23. 312 U.S. 410 (1941).
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discovered during the early months of 1930 that the financial
position of Long-Bell was rapidly declining. The defendants clear-
ly had knowledge of these reverses by May 17, 1930, the date of
the plaintiff's initial purchase, but they nevertheless failed to in-
form the plaintiff. Subsequently, Long-Bell went into receivership.
The Supreme Court, applying Iowa law, unanimously held that
the brokerage firm had a duty to inform the plaintiff of Long-
Bell's steady and serious decline occurring after the balance sheet
date. This case may be distinguished from Fischer v. Kletz be-
cause the balance sheet was supplied at the plaintiff's request.
Indeed, the Supreme Court relied partly on the theory that the
incompleteness of the broker's response, by not supplying all
of the information in their possession, constituted only a par-
tial truth in light of that knowledge. The principle underlying the
decision, however, is that a broker who makes representations con-
cerning the financial status of a company relating to a sale of bonds,
and who subsequently learns of changes in that company's status,
has a duty to reveal those changes to a prospective purchaser.
24
In substance, this is an application of the change in conditions
doctrine.
The Loewer v. Harris25 reasoning has not been confined to a
change of conditions factual setting. The Second Circuit applied
the liability for nondisclosure principle to a change of knowledge
situation in Fitzgerald v. McFadden,26 an action against an attorney
and his principal for fraudulent nondisclosure. The attorney rep-
resented to the plaintiff that his principal had invented a patent-
able process. After a number of interviews between the parties,
the attorney solicited financial backing from the plaintiff. On
December 14, 1931, the parties signed a contract whereby the plain-
tiff was to supply part of the capital needed to exploit the process.
In response to an inquiry originating from the plaintiff, the de-
fendant attorney was advised on January 1, 1932, that the patent,
then in the application stages, would not issue because of a prior
patent on a similar process. The attorney waited until January 21,
1932, before notifying the plaintiff of the prior patent. During this
three week period the plaintiff made certain payments required by
the December 14th contract. Judge Learned Hand, citing Loewer
v. Harris, held that the attorney's silence when he knew the plain-
tiff was acting on the basis of a false representation subjected
him to personal liability for the payments.27 The court applied the
change in conditions rule to a change of knowledge situation with-
out acknowledging the difference between the two.
Such a uniform application of this rule does not take into con-
24. See also RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 551(2) (b) (1938).
25. 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893).
26. 88 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1938).
27. Accord, Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 379, 305 P.2d 669,
683 (1957); see McGinn v. McGinn, 50 R.I. 236, 146 A. 636 (1929).
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sideration the qualitative differences between the two factual sit-
uations involved. Specifically, liability for nondisclosure has re-
quired a special relationship between the parties before a duty to
disclose is created.2 8 The rationale for this requirement in the
change of conditions setting is incontrovertible. Assuming that the
party making the representation intended it to portray only facts
which existed at the time he made it, and the representation ac-
curately depicts the facts, it would be a harsh burden to require
him to update the representation to everyone relying on it each
time he learned of a change in facts which affected it. When there
is a special relationship between the parties, however, there is a
justification for the duty.
It does not necessarily follow that the requirement of a fiduci-
ary or other special relationship should attach in a change of
knowledge setting. The quality of the original representation is
substantially different. Although the party making the represen-
tation meant it to relate existing conditions, his statement was in
fact erroneous. When he discovers the falsity of the representation,
it is submitted that he has a legal duty to correct the misleading
statement regardless of whether a special relationship exists.
This duty arises notwithstanding his good faith belief in the accur-
acy of the representation at the time he made it. Its purpose is to
prevent injury to persons who are justifiably relying on the state-
ment.29 By his affirmative action in making the representation, the
party created a duty (or special relationship which resulted in a
duty) to correct any error which he subsequently discovers.
Clearly, this suggested duty in the change of knowledge situa-
tion is not as extensive as that imposed by the traditional rule.
Here the party making the representation must notify persons
known to be relying on it only of subsequent discoveries which
render the representation false at the time it was made. There is
no duty to inform them of a subsequent change in conditions. This
distinction would make little difference in the cases previously
discussed because there was a special relationship present in each
of them.30 In Fischer, however, the traditional concept of special
relationship is absent. The court thus had three alternatives; it
could (1) apply the traditional rule strictly and conclude that no
duty existed; (2) expand the concept of "parties to a business
transaction" (a special relationship) to include a public accountant-
investor relation; or (3) adopt a new rule based on the change of
28. See PRossEa, ToRTs § 101 (3rd ed. 1964).
29. Although the Fischer court never explicitly states that it assumes
reliance, its entire discussion of common law liability assumes that the
investors justifiably relied on the accountants' audit. For a further dis-
cussion of reliance see note 53 infra.
30. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410 (1941)




conditions-change of knowledge distinction. In concluding that a
duty existed, the court reasoned that there was a sufficient connec-
tion between the accounting firm and the stockholders to bring
them within the framework of "parties to a business transaction."''
This rationale would seem merely to obscure the true basis of the
decision: prevention of injury to persons known to be relying on
the original representation. It is submitted that the change of
knowledge rule provides a framework which more effectively im-
plements the underlying policy for imposing a duty.
That the defendant need not gain or benefit from his non-
disclosure to be liable is implicit in the change of knowledge formu-
lation of duty. This proposition has been upheld in nondisclosure
cases when the defendants were persons other than accountants32
and when the cause of action was based on affirmative misrepre-
sentations.3 3 Thus it would seem logical that in Fischer, a non-
disclosure case in which the defendants were accountants, gain
should not be a condition precedent to liability.
Applying the change of knowledge concept of duty to Fischer,
the accountants would clearly be liable for failing to correct the
false certification. Sometime during 1964, PMM discovered that
Yale's financial condition was substantially less favorable than the
the 1963 balance sheet had indicated. Nevertheless, they waited
a substantial period of time (at least five months) before making
their knowledge public. Since PMM knew the statements it had
certified were false and that its certification was being relied upon
by the investing public as a true statement of Yale's financial con-
dition on December 31, 1963, PMM was obligated to reveal the
falsity of the balance sheet.
31. The act of certification is similar in its effect to a representation
made in a business transaction. Both supply information which is natur-
ally and justifiably relied upon by individuals for decisional purposes.
Viewed in this context of the impact of nondisclosure on the injured
party, it is difficult to conceive that a distinction between accountants and
parties to a business transaction is warranted. 266 F. Supp. at 186.
32. An emphatic statement denying the necessity of gain to an action
based on nondisclosure was quoted by the Fischer court:
The complainants have been damaged to their hurt, and the de-
fendant . . .was a factor therein. That is the gravamen of the
charge; not that defendant . . .has gained, but that complainants
have lost by his fault.
Goldsmith v. Koopman, 140 F. 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1905). It should be
noted, however, that the defendant in Goldmith stood to gain substantially
if the business venture in which he and plaintiffs were engaged had been
successful.
33. See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416
(1938). There is abundant authority in affirmative misrepresentation cases
not involving accountants that gain is not a prerequisite to liability. See,
e.g., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927);
Hartford Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co., 168 F.2d
381 (10th Cir. 1948); Hindeman v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 F. 931 (6th Cir.
1902); DeSwarte v. First Nat'l Bank, 188 Wis. 455, 206 N.W. 887 (1926);
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 61(c) (1943).
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The rationale for imposing liability on the accountants is rein-
forced by approaching the problem from another perspective. Con-
sider a hypothetical situation the same as Fischer, except that the
accountants knew at the time they made their certification that the
balance sheet contained substantial errors. Clearly in that situa-
tion the accountants would be liable under the common law for
their false representations.84 Compare this hypothetical with
Fischer. In both instances the representations are material and
false. In both there is reliance by and damage to a segment of the
investing public. In both cases there is knowledge of falsity. Only
the time of acquiring that knowledge is different; but once the
accountants in the Fischer situation have learned of the falsity,
they are in substantially the same position vis-A-vis the investing
public as are the accountants who made affirmative misrepresen-
tations. It does not reasonably follow that differing concepts of
liability should be imposed.
The scope of the common law action of deceit has been greatly
broadened since the decision in Derry v. Peek."' Specifically, after-
acquired information which discloses the falsity of a party's rep-
resentation has subjected him to liability.3 6 Although these cases
involve a contractual or fiduciary relationship to which the court
could point as establishing a special duty, it is submitted that any
party who makes a representation which he knows or should know
is being relied upon, and which he subsequently learns is false,
has a duty to inform the relying parties of the inaccuracies. This
duty arises out of the relationship which the representing party
created by offering the representation. It exists regardless of
whether the party making the representation stands to gain
from it. Application of this concept of duty to Fischer v. Kletz
leaves little doubt that the defendant accountants should be liable
for their nondisclosure.
FEDERAL STATUTORY LIABnmrrY
A second ground on which liability may be predicated is the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3T Specifically, the complaint in
Fischer alleged liability under section 10b of the Exchange Act38
34. See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416
(1938); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
35. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
36. See Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 379, 305 P.2d 669, 683
(1957); McGinn v. McGinn, 50 R.I. 236, 146 A. 636 (1929). See also
PROSSER, supra note 28, at 711:
[O]ne who has made a statement, and subsequently ac-
quires new information which makes it untrue or misleading,
must disclose such information to anyone he knows to be still acting
on the basis of the original statement ...
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1984):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
NOTES
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and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC.39 The rule
makes it unlawful for any person "to engage in any act, practice
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. '40 Plaintiffs claimed that the accountants, in
failing to disclose their after-acquired information, engaged in a
practice which violated the Act and rule.
Although this section and rule are essentially regulatory, they
have been recognized for twenty years as providing a basis for
civil liability.41 The rationale for civil liability was set forth in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 42 The plaintiffs brought suit for an
accounting of profits against officers and directors of Western Board
and Paper Company, which had merged with National Gypsum.
The complaint alleged that defendants had fraudulently misrepre-
sented and concealed facts which induced the plaintiffs to sell
their stock to the defendants. Western's officers had negotiated
an agreement to sell Western to National, but failed to advise
plaintiffs of the agreement. The defendants, who anticipated a
profit from this sale, induced the plaintiffs to sell them their stock
at a price substantially lower than that which obtained immedi-
ately after National's acquisition. The complaint urged liability
under section 10b of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5. Defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, contending
that even if their conduct violated section 10b and rule 10b-5, they
could not be held civilly liable under a regulatory statute. The
court denied the motion on the ground that civil liability could
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
. (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
or any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or. deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of inivestors,
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967):..
It'shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
'the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device; scheme, -or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 'material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or- deceit upon any person,
in connection with the, purchase or sale of any security.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir. 1956);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
42. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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exist under section 10b and rule 10b-5. Applying section 286 of the
Restatement of Torts,43 the court said that a legislative enactment
regulatory in nature can provide a standard of conduct in civil
actions if the intent of the statute is to protect an interest of the
person claiming injury and the interest invaded is one which the
statute intended to protect. In Kardon the investors were the per-
sons whom the statute meant to protect. The interest invaded was
the right to purchase and sell securities free from the manipulative
and deceptive devices proscribed in section 10b and rule 10b-5.
Through this interpretation of the Restatement, the court found
that defendants had a duty to inform plaintiffs of the pending
merger.
Once a legal duty had been established, the court was able to
apply section 27 of the Exchange Act,44 which gives the federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction of all "actions at law brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the
rules and regulations thereunder."4 5 By combining section 286 of
the Restatement of Torts and the jurisdictional section of the Ex-
change Act, the court held that a civil duty arose under section 10b
and rule 10b-5 and that its violation created a federal cause of
action.
Since the genesis of civil liability in Kardon, the concept of
fraud under section 10b and rule 10b-5 has been subjected to nu-
merous judicial interpretations. One reason for the multiplicity of
interpretations is the attempt to effectuate the broad congressional
purpose of the Exchange Act: protection of the investing public. 46
This goal is to be achieved by "the maintenance of fair and hon-
est markets in [national security exchange and over-the-counter]
transactions. '47  Specifically, section 10b makes unlawful the em-
ployment of any manipulative or deceptive device which contra-
venes the public interest. By emphasizing this congressional man-
date to protect the public, the courts have ignored traditional
common law definitions and stretched the concept of fraud into
many forms.
The language of the SEC rules gives the courts great latitude
in determining what conduct involving security transactions con-
stitutes fraud. Rule 10b-5 imposes liability upon any person who
employs a scheme or artifice to defraud, actively conceals or par-
tially discloses material facts, or engages in any business practice
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
46. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1953);
Charles Hughes & Co. v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.
1943); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1966); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
NOTES
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which would operate as a fraud. Certainly this language, in light
of congressional intent, was not meant to restrict liability for fraud
under the Exchange Act to the traditional common law concept.48
The elements of fraud under section 10b of the Act and rule
10b-5 were thoroughly discussed in Texas Continental Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Bankers Bond Co. 49 Texas Continental brought an ac-
tion against the defendant brokerage firm to recover initial pay-
ments made on a purchase of municipal bonds. The brokers con-
spired to conceal from Texas the fact that the bonds could be re-
tired by the issuance of new bonds as well as by cash. The
plaintiff sought as damages return of the initial payments with in-
terest. Although liability was claimed under two sections of the
Exchange Act, the court said that the case was "squarely within
Rule X-10B-5"5 0 and held that in an action for fraud under this
rule, a good faith purchaser does not have the burden of proving
deceit or intentional fraud. He "need only prove that a statement
in a prospectus or oral communication is in fact false or is a mis-
leading omission and that he did not know of such untruth or
omission." 51 This interpretation of the rule appears to disregard
the common law requirement of scienter, but the court restricted
its application to a situation in which the defendant in "good con-
science '5 2 should have made the disclosures.
The Bankers Bond case may be distinguished from Fischer in
at least two respects. All the defendant brokers gained from
the sale and all were alleged to be involved in a conspiracy to
withhold information from the plaintiff. A third potential distinc-
tion is the relief sought in each case. In Bankers Bond, although
the action was for damages, Texas only sought a return of the pur-
chase price of the bonds with interest. The damages sought by the
plaintiffs in Fischer are unclear.
Despite these differences, the Bankers Bond case is significant
for its development of the requirements for fraud under rule
48. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963),
where the court said:
State court decisions involving fraud and misrepresentation
are applicable [to section 10b and rule lOb-5] only indirectly as
supplementary aids in establishing standards of diligence. Con-
gress has established its own standard which is to be measured
by federal law interpreting the statute and the rule unhindered by
restrictive applications of state common law. The need for uni-
form rules regulating transactions governed by federal law makes
necessary such a holding.
See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Com-
ment, The Prospects for Rule X-IOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
49. 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on grounds of erroneous
factual determination by trial court sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).





10b-5. Five major elements appeared in the court's discussion of
fraud: (1) a good faith purchaser or seller; (2) a misrepresenta-
tion or misleading omission; (3) a showing that the party making
the representation in good conscience should have revealed the fal-
sity or omissions (this standard is construed in conjunction with
the purpose of the Exchange Act to maintain fair and honest mar-
kets); (4) reliance by the purchaser or seller on the representa-
tions;53 and (5) use of the facilities of interstate commerce or a
national securities exchange.54 These criteria for fraud clearly do
not correspond to the common law concept; rather, they consti-
tute a "constructive fraud" under section 10b and rule lOb-5.
Although no case decided under section 10b and rule 10b-5
attempts to formulate general rules for constructive fraud, it will
be seen that the elements outlined above are prevalent in the cases.
The plaintiffs in Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc.55 were stock-
holders of Bargain City who had purchased their stock in over-the-
counter transactions. Before buying the stock, they consulted
Bargain City's certified financial statements in a Standard & Poor's
manual. 6 In reliance on these statements, which had been certi-
fied by the defendant accounting firm, the plaintiffs purchased
Bargain City stock at inflated prices. When the true financial
condition of the corporation became known, the stock prices
dropped in value to 5% of the price plaintiffs had paid for their
shares. The complaint alleged that the corporation and account-
ing firm engaged in a conspiracy in violation of section 10b and
rule 10b-5. In denying a motion to dismiss, the court ruled that a
defrauded purchaser or seller of stock is not limited to an action
against the other party to the sale, but may sue a third party who
had a connection with the fraudulent transaction. 57 The obvious
53. Since reliance was assumed by the court in Fischer, this Note does
not emphasize it. It must be recognized, however, that most courts have
held reliance to be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim under
section 10b and rule 10b-5. In stock purchase transactions, the reliance by
the purchaser on the accountant's certified report may be primary (made
after directly consulting the certified report) or secondary (made after
consultation with and on the recommendation of a broker who relied on
the accountant's certified report). In either situation, under rule 10b-5 "the
test of 'reliance' is whether 'the misrepresentation is a substantial factor
in determining the course of conduct which results in . . . loss.' RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938); accord, PROSSER, TORTS 550 (2d ed. 1955);
1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 583-84 (1956)." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (1965). See also Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by
the Federal Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 872, 885 (1967).
54. Cf. Klein, Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities
Investors Under Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MIAMn L. REV. 81, 101-02 (1965).
55. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
56. Id. at 36.
57. 229 F. Supp. at 38. The court quoted from New Park Mining Co.
v. Crammer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963):
A purchaser or seller of stock is not limited under Section 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 to an action against the other party to the pur-
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result of this ruling was that an accountant could not escape liability
under section 10b and rule 10b-5.
All the elements of constructive fraud were present in Bar-
gain City. The plaintiffs were good faith purchasers who relied
on the fraudulent representations, presuming to their detriment
that there were no misleading omissions. The "good conscience"
standard, fortified by the Exchange Act policy of protecting in-
vestors, imposed a duty on the defendant accountants to disclose
the falsity of and omissions in the financial statement. Their
failure to make the disclosures, even absent an allegation of gain,
justified a denial of the motion to dismiss.
An interesting comparison can be made by evaluating Kohler
v. Kohler Co.58 in terms of the standards set forth in Bankers Bond.
The plaintiff sought damages arising out of a sale of Kohler Com-
pany stock. Kohler Company was a closely held corporation which
had only twenty-six stockholders at the time of the transaction.
The plaintiff, a former director of the corporation, charged that
the defendant accountants had induced him through misrepresen-
tations, half truths, and omissions to sell his stock to the company
at ten dollars per share less than its actual market value. The
complaint alleged that the accountants, in performing an audit
of the company to project the value of the stock, used procedures
which failed to include certain material assets and depressed after-
tax earnings. Certain of these computations had not been made in
the same manner in previous audits. The court found, however,
that none of the defendants' conduct violated a standard of "fair
and honest business practice" (comparable to the "good conscience"
standard in Bankers Bond). The accounting methods varied only
slightly from those used in previous valuations and all the ac-
counting procedures were conducted in accordance with commonly
accepted and approved accounting principles.5 9
In concluding that the accountants were not liable, the Kohler
court examined the same elements considered by the Bankers Bond
court. Kohler was a good faith purchaser who relied on the ac-
countants' representations. The court reached a different result
because the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were not
false or misleading, and the representations in the audit were
made in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Most of the cases heretofore discussed have involved a com-
chase or sale; he can sue a third person if in connection with the
purchase or sale that person defrauded him.
But see Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the court
held that failure of the defendant directors to disclose that certain cor-
poration reports overstated the corporation's assets was intended to mis-
lead the government, not the plaintiff stockholders. Consequently, the
manipulation was said not to have arisen in connection with the purchase
or sale of stock.
58. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
59. Id. at 639.
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bination of affirmative misrepresentations and nondisclosure. Oth-
er cases, however, deal solely with nondisclosure as a basis for
liability under section 10b and rule 1Ob-5. In Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Insurance Co.60 nondisclosure of a broker's
fraudulent conduct by a corporation which knew that he was ma-
nipulating their stock was a sufficient claim to bring the defend-
ant corporation to trial. The plaintiff alleged that the principal
defendant, a broker, withheld delivery of Midwestern stock certifi-
cates from over-the-counter purchasers. The broker used the pur-
chase money as working capital for speculation and made false
representations to explain the delay. Subsequently the broker
went into bankruptcy. The plaintiffs charged that Midwestern
knew about the broker's activities, that these activities tended to
inflate the price of Midwestern's stock to their gain, and that Mid-
western's failure to disclose constituted a fraudulent aiding and
abetting. The court, although confining its decision to denial of a
motion to dismiss, tendered the opinion that Midwestern's failure
to take any affirmative action would not preclude recovery on the
theory of aiding and abetting.
61
The Brennan court's hesitancy to impose liability does not
seem justified in light of Pettit v. American Stock Exchange.62  In
Pettit the defendant stock exchange permitted the sale of stock
which had not been registered with the SEC; the stock was sold
despite the fact that no shareholder reports had been issued for
over five years. The plaintiffs, trustees in bankruptcy, alleged that
the exchange's nondisclosure aided and abetted the party com-
mitting the fraud and consequently violated section 10b and rule
10b-5. The court said: "Since knowing assistance of or participa-
tion in a fraudulent scheme under Section 10(b) gives rise to lia-
bility equal to that of the perpetrators themselves, the facts al-
leged by the trustees,. if proven,. would permit recovery under
Section 10(b) "63 Although the trustees failed to allege fraud, the
court ruled that their complaint alleging violations of section
10b and rule lOb-5 was sufficient to notify the defendants of con-
duct implicating them in the fraud.
Pettit is significant in at least three respects: the action arose
in a nondisclosure situation; there was no direct gain to the de-
fendants; and the complaint, while alleging that defendant aided
and abetted a violation of section 1Ob and rule 10b-5, failed to di-
60. 259 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
61. The court said:
To rest the definition of aiding and abetting solely on ab-
stract and mechanical distinctions between active and passive
assistance or to hold blindly that silence and inaction cannot con-
stitute aiding and abetting under any possible set of circumstances
would be to defeat and hamper the intelligent and responsible
development of the law by subjecting it to a tyranny of labels.
259 F. Supp. at 682.
62. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
63. Id. at 28.
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rectly charge fraud. Nevertheless, the court held that the allega-
tions of the complaint, if proven, would subject the defendant
to liability for fraud.
Applying the authorities which have been discussed to the
facts in Fischer, it appears that there is strong precedent for hold-
ing the accountants liable for their nondisclosure. The elements
of constructive fraud, as set forth in Bankers Bond, are all present.
The plaintiffs purchased Yale stocks and bonds on a national
securities exchange. The accountant's certification was filed with
the SEC, an agency which regulates interstate commerce. The
stocks and bonds were purchased in reliance on the accountant's
false and misleading representation of the financial condition of
Yale. Although PMM made the representation in good faith, it
subsequently learned of its falsity and knew at that time that the
representation was still being relied upon by the investing public.
Under either the "good conscience" standard 4 or the "fair and
honest business practice" standard,65 PMM's conduct is censur-
able. The purpose of the Exchange Act, and particularly section
10b, is to protect the investing public from manipulative or de-
ceptive devices and practices.6 Rule lOb-5 makes misrepresentation
or nondisclosure in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security an unlawful act when it operates as a fraud on any per-
son.67 By withholding public notice of the falsity of the financial
reports to which its certification was attached, PMM allowed a
fraud of which it had knowledge to continue. 68 This fraud re-
sulted in substantial loss to numerous persons who relied on PMM's
certification. It is submitted that under these facts the court would
be justified in both law and policy to hold the accountants liable.
The Fischer court expressed little doubt whether an action
could be maintained under section 10b and rule 10b-5 absent an
allegation of direct gain or benefit. The elements of constructive
fraud, as formulated under the statute and rule, clearly do not
64. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. V. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp.
14, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
65. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1963).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
67. See H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(preparation by accountants of false and misleading financial statements
in furtherance of a conspiracy to induce the plaintiff to merge, which
resulted in a substantial loss, justified denial of the defendant account-
ant's motion to dismiss).
68. It should be noted that the SEC agrees with this interpretation:
Failure by an accountant to disclose that financial statements
of a company which it has certified are false when it has be-
come aware of that fact is, under Rule lOb-5(3), an act or
course of business which operates as a fraud on persons in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities of that company.
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Fischer v. Kletz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 91,844, at 95,889 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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require gain. In neither Bargain City6 9 nor Pettit ° did the de-
fendants directly gain from their misrepresentations or nondis-
closure. The courts were nevertheless able to find a sufficient
basis for imposing liability. They reasoned that since the purpose
of the statute is to prevent fraud, knowing assistance in a fraudu-
lent scheme is a violation of duty.71 In Fischer the accountants'
silence when they had knowledge of the fraud and knew that their
representations were being relied upon is no less than knowing
assistance. If the accountants had disclosed the falsity of the finan-
cial report immediately after their discovery of error, as fair and
honest business practices require, the investing public would have
received the statutorily required protection. When the account-
ants chose to secret this information, they violated a duty im-
posed on them under section 10b and rule lOb-5.
THE AccouNTANT-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
One of PMM's objections to the imposition of liability for non-
disclosure is that their special studies were not performed in an
independent capacity.72 Certification of an annual report must be
made by an independent public accountant. 8 PMM asserted
that the requirement of independence and the duty of public dis-
closure which it imposes ended with their good faith certification
of the 1963 annual report. The accountants reason that their rela-
tionship to Yale with respect to the special study of profits and
income was not that of an independent auditor, but more closely
approximated that of an employee, fiduciary or lawyer. Conse-
quently, PMM contended that it should not be charged with the
same duty as an independent auditor.
This argument is supported by compelling policy reasons. Cer-
tainly the position of accounting firms in the modern business world
would be undermined if accountant-client communications were
not confidential. 74 If accountants were not only permitted, but
required to divulge their knowledge of a client's affairs, an account-
ant's utility to his client might be greatly outweighed by the
possible detrimental effects of disclosing the client's financial posi-
69. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
70. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
71. Id. at 28.
72. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
73. Securities Exchange Act § 13(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (a) (2)
(1964).
74. The status given by some states to the accountant-client rela-
tionship is reflected in statutes which recognize for evidentiary purposes
that their communications are privileged. This privilege comes only by
legislative enactment since it was not recognized at common law. For a
discussion of accountant's evidentiary privilege, see Katsoris, Confidential
Communications-The Accountants' Dilemma, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 51
(1966); 32 TExAs L. REV. 453 (1954).
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tion.7 5 One conceivable result of restricting this confidential re-
lationship would be to reduce the employment of outside accounting
firms by organizations large enough to afford their own staffs. In
corporations which have their own accounting department, the
management would lose the benefit of independent, yet confiden-
tial, opinion of their financial operations. Perhaps of greater
importance would be the loss of an independent check on the work
of their own accountants. Thus, to maintain the integrity of the
accounting profession, the courts should recognize the necessity of a
confidential relationship when the accountant's status is "de-
pendent"; that is, when the public accountant's primary obligation
is to its client and not the public.
By contrast, the "independent" public accountant is relatively
free from the direction and control of his employer.76 He still
maintains a relation of trust and confidence with his client, but
this duty becomes subordinate to his responsibility for the accur-
acy and clarity of his audit.77 This posture has often been re-
ferred to as the maintenance of a judicial impartiality with respect
to the affairs of the client.78 The rationale underlying this role
is a duty to the public-to those persons who will rely on the
statements of the auditor.
In the Fischer case there is an apparent clash between the
independent and dependent roles of an accountant. If PMM had
discovered the falsity of the statements contained in the balance
sheet while it was acting in the capacity of an independent auditor,
but before it had filed its certification with the SEC, its public
duty would have been paramount. Disclosure would have been re-
quired. On the other hand, if PMM had never performed the inde-
pendent audit, it could have made the special study for Yale with-
out the possibility of incurring liability for nondisclosure. The
problem arises because with respect to the 1963 financial statement
PMM was "independent"; when they discovered the inaccuracies,
however, they were employed in a "dependent," or private, capac-
ity. Thus, the court was required to determine which standard
should apply.
The basic issue is which policy-trust and confidence in the
accountant-client relationship or protection of the public-will pre-
75. In J. CAREY, PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
164 (1956), the author writes:
[The accountant] is often the repository of information of the
most personal nature. Often he is engaged by competitors in the
same line of business, each of whom would be most interested
to know about the affairs of the other. It would be fatal to the
CPA's own professional career, and damaging to the whole pro-
fession, if information entrusted to him were improperly revealed.
76. W. SHANNON, LEGAL ACCOUNTING 15 (1961).
77. Id.; see L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
22.3 (2d rev. ed. 1966).




vail. If the privilege arising from the dependent relationship is
recognized to the exclusion of any public responsibility, the account-
ant's only duty is to report the inaccuracies to his client. In the
Fischer setting, such disclosure would provide little public protec-
tion. The facts in Fischer as revealed by depositions indicated
that Yale's management had notice of the inaccuracies in Novem-
ber 1964,' if not earlier. Nevertheless, there was no public dis-
closure until May 1965, a delay which could hardly be said to
promote the public interest. Furthermore, the management may
well have known of the inaccuracies when PMM was supplied
the information on which it based its certification. If this were
the case, the end to be served by notifying management that it
was committing a fraud is at best elusive. Nevertheless, if the
privilege arising from PMM's dependent role were recognized with-
out regard to its duty as an independent auditor, the court in
Fischer would be condoning fraud.
Finally, such rigid adherence to this confidential relationship
would have a dubious effect on the accounting profession. One of
its avowed interests is to preserve a public confidence-to main-
tain "a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation ...
for a fair presentation of the facts . . . not only to the manage-
ment and owners of the business . . . but also to the creditors of
the business, and to those who may otherwise have a right to rely
. ..upon the auditor's report, as in the case of prospective owners
or creditors."80  To sanction the continuance of a fraud, known
to exist by accountants who certified a report which conceals that
fraud, would undermine faith in the accounting profession.8 '
An appropriate solution would be adoption of a rule that by
undertaking the independent audit of the 1963 annual report,
PMM waived any claims to dependent status with respect to
subsequent discoveries of information pertinent to that financial re-
port. This rule would preserve confidence in the dependent ac-
countant in those cases in which he has not made representations
which mislead the investing public. At the same time, it would
ensure that the financial information supplied to potential in-
vestors and creditors is as current and accurate as possible.
Imposing a duty to disclose after-acquired information raises
the additional problem of to whom disclosure should be made. As
noted previously, disclosure to the management of the offending
79. 266 F. Supp. at 196.
80. Statement of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants' Committee on Auditing Procedure, quoted in L. RAPPAPORT, supra
note 77, at 22.2.
81. See statement by the Executive Director of the American Insti-
tute of Accounting, quoted with approval by the SEC: "The certified
public accountant acknowledges a moral responsibility to be as mindful of
the interests of strangers who may rely on his opinion as of the interests
of his client who pays his fee." In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart,
37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957).
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corporation will not necessarily result in protection of the invest-
ing public. It is submitted that under the common law, adequate
disclosure would be made if the accountants filed an amended
balance sheet with the exchanges on which the corporation's
stock is traded and gave notice of such filing in one or two trade
publications (e.g., Barron's or The Wall Street Journal). This con-
structive notice of the amended financial statement should suf-
fice to discharge the accountant's duty not only to the investing
public, but to stockholders of the corporation who had received
copies of the erroneous annual report.
To obviate Securities Exchange Act liability, in addition to
filing a copy of the amended financial report with the exchanges
on which the offending corporation's stock was registered or traded,
the accountant would file a copy with the SEC. The published
notice of the filing would inform the public that the amended state-
ment had been filed with the SEC as well as the exchanges. As
under the common law, the notice of filing would completely pro-
tect the accountant from liability if filed within a reasonable time
after discovery of the error.
8 2
CONCLUSION
The common law action of deceit originated in an era when
commercial investment was almost nonexistent. Since that time,
however, the marketplace has shifted from the village square to
Wall Street. The modern investor can no longer reach the situs of
his investment for regular inspections. With the development of
large industries requiring substantial capital development, many of
the premises on which deceit was founded have changed substan-
tially. Consequently, many of the legal principles formulated dur-
ing the infancy of the "commercial" era are no longer practical.
It appears that the common law was not able to adjust to these
changes as rapidly as was desirable.
Recognizing this situation, Congress enacted broad legislation
designed to regulate securities transactions." The purpose of these
statutes was to secure fair and honest markets by providing inves-
tors with reliable information on which to base their choice of
investments. 84 A duty was placed on those who had superior
knowledge of financial conditions to disclose their information.
Nondisclosure would defraud both actual and potential investors.
Specifically, under SEC rule 10b-5, engaging "in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
82. For further discussion of the consequences of disclosure by ac-
countants, see Comment, Accountants' Liability for Nondisclosure of Post-
Certification Discovery of Error, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 500, 514-16 (1968).
83. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1964); Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964); see Charles Hughes & Co. v. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
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or deceit on any persons in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security"8 5 was made unlawful. The courts have recognized
a civil duty arising out of this rule and have given an action for
damages for its breach.8
The independent public accountant, as a party with superior
knowledge, shares the responsibility to prevent fraud. The finan-
cial statements he audits and certifies are relied upon by inves-
tors and creditors as representing an accurate and responsible eval-
uation of the financial condition of his client. When an account-
ant certifies financial statements which he subsequently learns are
erroneous, he has a duty to disclose their falsity. Disclosure is
not a harsh burden to place on an accountant in this situation
since one of the main purposes of his audit is to disclose error in
the corporation's figures. If the accountant breaches this duty and
someone is injured by his fault, however, it would seem a harsh
burden to make the innocent party suffer the damages. It is
submitted that since Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company
breached their duty to disclose, their liability for damages to per-
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